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On 10th September 1990 the Government of Malta deposited instruments 
of ratification with the United Nations Secretary General for four multilateral 
treaties concerned with the international protection of human rights. These 
are: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereafter referred to as Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant); The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter referred to 
as International Covenant); The Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter referred to as Optional 
Protocol), all three adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, 
1 and the Convention Against Torture. and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter referred to as the UN 
Convention on Torture) adopted by the General Assembly in 1984 2•
All four treaties serve one common purpose: the protection of fundamental 
human rights and liberties through international legal regulation. But each 
instrument engenders a separate series of obligations for States in international 
law and the effect of the implementation of these undertakings by Malta, as 
a State Party, on our laws will be varied and revolutionary. 
The present outline is offered as a succinct record of the principal features 
incorporated in these instruments and of the contribution made by these texts 
to the formation of an ever developing comprehensive regime concerning 
international human rights protection that will become operative under our law. 
Collective Rights 
In addition to the provisions defining the traditional rights of individuals 
found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention 
on Human Rights 3 the 1966 International Covenants introduce, and they are 
innovative in this respect, the concept of so-called collective rights. Part I, which 
is common to and worded in indentical terms in both Covenants, provides for 
the exercise by peoples of their right to self-determination and of exclusive 
control over their natural wealth and resources. The remedial process provided 
for in the Covenants in respect of breach of such collective rights, may not 
be invoked by subjects of rights other than States and collective entities. This 
is the interpretation offered by the UN Human Rights Committee established 
under the International Covenant. 
The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant 
The 1961 European Social Charter, to which Malta is also a Party, is 
supplemented by the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant. In 
addition, to the comprehensive coverage of various aspects involved in the right 
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to work offered by the European Social Charter, the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Covenant includes: 
(i) the right to adequate standard of living for individuals and families·
(ii) the right to freedom from hunger;
(iii) the right to enjoyment of physical and mental health;
(iv) the right to education;
(v) the right to participate in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress; and,
(vi) the right to pursue scientific research.
States Parties to the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant are
obliged, inter alia, to submit periodic reports to the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council recording the measures undertaken to ensure protection 
of the rights defined therein. These reports may, in turn, be transmitted by 
the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly and other UN 
specialised agencies which may either report back on the performance of States 
Partie's fulfillment of their obligations under the Covenant and / or make 
recommendations on how a State Party ought to improve its efforts in order 
to satisfy its contractural obligations under the Covenant. 
The International Covenant 
States Parties to the International Covenant are also obliged to submit 
reports to the Human Rights Committee indicating factors and difficulties 
incurred in the implementation of the Covenant. On its own initiative the 
Human Rights Committee may also request States Parties to submit reports 
which, upon their consideration, may elect to exercise one or more of the 
following uptions: 
(a) it may report back with its comments and recommendations to the
reporting State Party concerned;
(b) it may advise the UN Secretary-General to send copies or parts of State
Parties' reports to a specialised UN body within whose field of competence
that report may fall;
and,
( c) it may transmit copies of the reports together with its comments to the
UN Economic and Social Council.
States Parties may also lodge with the Human Rights Committee 
complaints indicating that other States Parties are not fulfilling their obligations 
under the International Covenant. It is necessary for States Parties to declare 
their acceptance of the Committee's competance to receive and consider such 
complaints before they may submit representations. The Goverrunent of Malta 
has recognised the competence of the Human Rights Committee in its 
instruments of ratification. 
Where matters which form the basis of such complaints are not resolved 
satisfactorily between the States Parties concerned, it may be agreed for an 
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ad hoc committee known as Conciliation Commission to be established by the 
Human Rights Committee in order that the Commission will use its good offices 
to reach a settlement. Where no agreement is reached the Commission shall 
report its findings on questions of fact, including its views on the possibilities 
of reaching an amicable solution to the Human Rights Committee. This report 
shall also record written and oral submissions delivered by States Parties before 
the Commission. Within three months from receipt of their copy of the report, 
the States Parties concerned must indicate to the Human Rights Committee 
whether or not they accept its contents. 
Optional Protocol 
The casus foederis of the Optional Protocol broadens ratione personae the 
remedial process for human rights violations operative under the International 
Covenant. Desirious to further secure the international protection of human 
rights, the Optional Protocol was drafted and adopted to permit individuals 
to submit communications to the Human Rights Committee informing it of 
alleged breaches of their rights by States Parties. Communications may only 
be submitted by individuals subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party to the 
Protocol. Accordingly, the invocation of the process of accountability under 
the Optional Protocol is no·t exclusive to nationals of States Parties. Thus, it 
will be permissable for aliens present in Maltese territory to inform the Human 
Rights Committee of any failure of the Government of Malta either in securing 
the exercise of fundamental liberties provided for in the International Covenant 
or for failure to provide a remedy where breach of fundamental rights has 
occurred. As a State Party to the Optional Protocol, Malta has accorded its 
nationals, residents and even its most temporary visitors access to a global rather 
than a regional forum dedicated to prevent and to remedy human rights 
violations. 
Communications will not be considered by the Human Rights Committee 
if: (a) they are anonymous, (b) remedies under national law are not previously 
exhausted, (this rule also applies to the complaints procedure operative under 
the International Covenant) and (c) the matter concerned is simultaneously 
under review by another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 
Howe,·er, when ratifying the Optional Protocol, Malta submitted its 
interpret<ltion of this third requirement and restricted the application of the 
rule by including matters that had already formed the subject matter of a 
previous inquiry. There is no "appear', therefore, to the Human Rights 
Committee from the decisions of the European Human Rights Commission. 
A person seeking a remedy against the Malta Government, after exhausting 
all remedies under national law, will have to choose between New York and 
Strasbourg. 
The reporting process and the filling of complaints and individual 
communications under the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, 
the International Covenant and the Optional Protocol respectively, may not, 
either singly or jointly, represent an effective international machinery capable 
of providing remedial action as that operative under the European Convention 
on Human Rights. However, alongside the "Strasbourg machinery", Maltese 
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nationals and persons present in Malta will have access to an 
additional / alternative international body designed to ensure the protection 
of fundamental rights and liberties by States Parties which, failing to fulfill 
their international obligations, would risk becoming subjects of scrutiny and 
exposure before the international community. 
Overall, these instruments (including the 1969 OAS Convention on 
Human Rights 4 and the 1981 OAU Charter on Human Rights 5) are
standard-setting in the international law on human rights. Since the end of 
the Second World War, they feature among the major international agreements 
"vhich have: (a) substantially contributed to the formation of a very specific 
corpus of peremptory rules in international law; (b) increased State 
accountability in the internation-:1 community;. and, more radically, 
( c) participated in the development of an international legal regime which now
provides individual punishment for human rights violations considered to be
criminal offen:es under international law. The UN Convention on Torture
is an excelknt i1 I1 ,stration of these developments.
Torture 
The UN Com·ention < - ,1.�orture differs significantly from the other three 
human rights i.nstruments rc..ti!ied by Malta in that the remedies it provides 
lie principally in the criminal law. The landmark achievements of the 1984 
treaty on torr ure are the follow�r.g. 
A. Unlike the Universal Declara�ion of Human Rights, the European
Convention on Human Rights, tlie Internatiom1t Co tenant on Civil and
Political Right�, the American Convention on Hurrn�n R1�)'!ts, and the African
Charter on Hum<'.n Rights, the UN Convention on Tonure not only prohibits
the practice of tortun-: but it provides, for the first time within the framework
of an internationaliy hnding :egal instrument, (i) a defir.ition of t�e concept
and (ii) proscribes il as �t c1 iminal offence.
Torture is defined d acts of severe p�in or suffering (physical or mental) 
intentionally inflicted by vr at the instigation of a public official or other 1)L·rson 
acting in an official caracity for one or more of the following purpo�e:; (i1 
obtaining from a persofi, ·r third party information or a confession; (ii) punishing 
a crime committed or �-.,sµected of having been committed, by a person or third 
party; (iii) intimidating o;· coercin� a person or third party; and, (iv) for any 
other reason based on discriminatioi . Thir ddinition is largely taken from article 
1 of the Declaration on the Protec c_,,·.� ;f All Persons from being Subjected to 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman .. )t �.Jegr:,.1ing Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted by consensus by the UN Gene-r,1! A�·, -r1:.>ly in 1975 6. That definition
also served as a useful working basis for th� ·.�. ti nition now ·11-11.jearing in the 
International American Convention To Pren til :•nd Punish Torcure adopted 
m 1985 by the Organisation of American Statt·� ; . 
States Parties to th<:· UN Conn:-ntion on Torture arc obliged to take all 
lll'(Tssary measures, and that includes legislation, to ensure that torture is 
rendered a criminal offence under· their laws. This obligation, now binding 
1990 77 
upon Malta, would result in the addition of torture as a separate crime under 
our Criminal Code. Currently, there is no definition of the crime of torture 
as such under our law. It would be a weak and conspicuously evasive approach 
by the Maltese legislator to argue that torture is adequately covered by the 
provisions concerning the crimes of bodily harm under the Criminal Code in 
an attempt to refrain from inserting necessary amendments thereto. Should 
such an approach form the basis oflegal advice offered by government lawyers, 
it would seriously question Malta's fulfillment of its international obligations 
contracted under the Convention. To argue that the practice of torture is 
adequately covered by the provisions regulating bodily harm under the Code, 
is tantamount to total disregard for the particular nature and specific intent 
required by the definition of torture under the UN Convention. 
Prima facie weaknesses in the definition of torture under the UN 
Convention include: (i) the qualification ratione personae of candidate offenders. 
This is restricted to public officials or persons acting in an official capacity. 
The legislator in Malta may wish to broaden this category to all individuals 
including those acting in a private capacity. The law would cater for all 
circumstances such as in a terrorist situation where torture may be practiced 
by hijackers (who do not usually occupy a public office) to obtain information 
from members of the crew or airline passengers. Such legislation would not 
run counter to the UN Convention on Torture because it permits national 
legislation to be of wider application ratione personae than that provided for 
in its definition of the crime of torture. 
B. Following the pattern of other standard�setting treaties, such as the 1970
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; the
1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation; the 1973 UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Committed Against Internationally Protected Persons
Including Diplomats; and the 1979 UN Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, the UN Convention on Torture incorporates a series of measures
which have transformed the criminal law content of international law and, when
implemented by Malta as State Party, will have a similar impact upon our
criminal law. These measures are listed below and will engender the following
consequences,
(i) Criminal Jurisdiction.
The Convention provides for the exercise of jurisdiction by States Parties
on four separate b-ases. These are: 
(a) the territorial principle including crimes committed on board vessels and
aircraft registered in the flag state.
(b) the active personality principle, i.e. where the perpetrator of the crime
is a national of the State Party;
( c) the passive personality principle, i.e. where the victim of the offence is
a national of the State Party;
a nd
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(d) the universality principle, i.e. when the offender is merely present in the
territory of a State Party.
The territoriality principle provided ·for under the Convention is in
conformity with our provisions on jurisdiction in the Criminal Code (Section 
5.a., b., & c.) and its implementation would not necessitate any amendment.
However, in view of Malta's obligation under the UN Convention on Torture
to take necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction in respect of the offence
of torture, legislation is required to ensure that the active, passive and
universality principles of jurisdiction stated above would form part of our law. 
Thus, in addition to the crimes defined in Section 5 .d. of the Criminal Code 
' 
in respect of which the active personality principle applies, there shall be added 
the crime of torture. The passive personality principle does not feature in Section 
5 of the Code and this will be a new ground by virtue of which torture may 
become justiciable before our courts even if committed outside Maltese territory. 
Finally, if the circumstances so present themselves, proceedings would have 
to be instituted in Malta if the presence of the alleged torturer is secured in 
Maltese territory and he is not extradited. His presence in Malta may well 
be the only juridical basis on which criminal proceedings are instituted: the 
offender and the victim may both be non-Maltese nationals and the offences 
may have taken place in the territory of a third State. This involves the 
application of the so-called principle .of universal jurisdiction which in Section 
5 of the ·Criminal Code applies -in respect of commercial fraud and forgery. 
When appropriate legislation is enacted, it will also become applicable vis-a­
vis torture. 
(ii) Aut Dedere Aut Punire
The application of the universal principle of jurisdiction in respect of torture
by States Parties under the UN Convention is circumscribed by the so-called 
aut dedere aut punire principle. In other words a State Party would exercise 
universal jurisdiction only where either no request for extradition is submitted, 
or, if such request is made, it is refused. The State Party which has presence 
of the offender is then obliged to institute criminal proceedings before its own 
competent tribunals. This is the essence of the either extradite or prosecute 
principle. The obligation is not on extradition but on institution of criminal 
proceedings. That the proceedings must result in a conviction is not obligatory 
under the UN Convention on Torture. It is sufficient that the case is brought 
before the competent national authorities for the purposes of prosecution. 
The essence of these provisions is to ensure the application of the "no 
safe haven" approach which is the casus foederis of the UN Convention on 
Torture and other treaties concerned with the international proscription of 
criminal offences. Th torturer, like the pirate before him, is now considered 
candidate for that "exclusive club" of outlaws in international law known as 
'' enemies of mankind''. However, State representatives involved in the drafting 
of the treaty would only accept an exception to the sacrosant principle of 
territorial jurisdiction if it formed part and parcel of the aut dedere aut punire 
principle. 
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(iii) Superior Orders
The fact that a person committed torture because he was following
"superior orders", is not an acceptable defence for a charge of the criminal 
offence of torture. This is provided for in the Co�vention and owes its presence 
to two factors: (a) the crime of torture is almost invariably committed in the 
execution of orders from a superior. Indeed, the definition of torture in the 
Convention includes reference to individual. responsibility for whomsoever 
instigates, consents or acquiesces that the crinie of torture may be perpetrated; 
and, (b) the non-applicability of the defence of "superior orders" dates from 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the 1945 Londoi:i 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals 
of the· European Axis. One of the Nuremberg legacies is the principle that the 
perpetrators of acts considered to be criminal offences under international law 
may not escape punishment by arguing that criminal responsibility is not 
incurred because they were merely following orders. This rule now applies to 
torturers. There is no provision contemplating this specific ground of defence 
under our law and legislation would be necessary, again, in view of Malta's 
general undertaking to ensure that torture is rendered a crime punishable under 
its law. 
(iv) Extradition
States Parties to the UN Convention on Torture are obliged to include
torture in all prospective extradition agreements concluded with other Stat�s 
Parties. In addition, torture is deemed to be included as an extraditable offence 
in extradition agreements already existing between States Parties, even if it 
is not specified therein. Further, States Parties, like Malta, which consider 
extradition to be conditional on the existence of an extradition treaty, may (there 
is no obligation here) consider the UN Convention on Torture as the 
appropriate legal basis for the purpose of entertaining an extradition request 
by othe·r States Parties. 
C. The processes of State accountability and reporting operative under the
UN Convenants and Optional Protocol are also to be found in the provisions
of the UN Convention of Torture. A Committee Against Torture has been
established and it receives reports from State Parties on the measures taken
in view of their obligations under the Convention. The submission of reports
by States Parties is obligatory. The first report is to be submitted within the
first year since the entry into force of the Convention for the State Party
concerned, thereafter reports are submitted periodically (every four years). An
exchange of comments and observations between the Committee and the
reporting State Party normally follows the reporting stages.
The Committee is empowered to take the following steps where it receives 
information from States Parties that torture is being systematically practiced 
in the territory of a State Party: 
(i) it will call upon the State Party concerned to present its own information
and observations on the matter raised; and,
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(ii) it may appoint one of its members to conduct a prompt and confidential
inquiry which could include visits to the territory of the State Party
concerned if this is permitted by same State Party.
On the conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee will transmit the findings
together with any comments or suggestions that it may deem proper to make 
to the State Party. The Committee may also indude a summary account of 
the matter raised in its annual report to States Parties and to the UN General 
Assembly. 
The procedure by which State complaints and individual communications 
are lodged with the UN Human Rights Committee also operates under the 
UN Convention on Torture. However, State Parties must first declare their 
acceptance of the competence of the Committee Against Torture to receive and 
to consider complaints and communications before they may participate in the 
review procedure administered by the Committee. The competence of the 
Committee has been recognised by Malta in its instrument of ratification. 
The Committee Against Torture differs in one important respect from 
the Human Rights Committee when considering communications from 
individuals subject to the jurisdiction of States Parties claiming to be victims 
of torture. Thus, whereas the Human Rights Committee will not entertain 
individual communications which form, simultaneously, the basis of 
consideration by a separate international investigation or settlement, the 
Committee Against Torture, in addition will not entertain communications 
that have already been considered under an alternative procedure of inquiry. 
However, in view of Malta's interpretation of the competence of the Human 
Rights Committee as being identical, in this respect, to that of the Committee 
Against Torture, the distinction between the two becomes academic in so far 
as Maltese nationals and others present in Malta may benefit under these 
instruments. 
Accordingly, the review mechanisms of the Committee Against Torture 
run along lines similar to those of the Human Rights Committee. Indeed the 
UN Copvention on Torture recommends that States Parties ought to consider 
members of the Human Rights Committee as can_didates most suitable for 
nomination to the Committee Against Torture. 
However, the Committee Against Torture represents the reaffirmation 
of a process that has developed in international practice whereby the supervision 
of human rights protection has progressed, initially, from being administered 
by international fora whose terms ratione materiae covered a broad range of 
fundamental rights and freedoms (e.g. the Human Rights Committee and the 
European Commission of Human Rights) to specialised bodies entrusted with 
ensuring respect for very specific human rights. Thus the Committee established 
under the UN Convention on Torture rather than creates duplicity projects 
continuity and is squarely consistent with previous practice evidenced, inter 
alia, by the establishment of the Committee of Racial Discrimination under 
the 1966 UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and the Special Committee on Apartheid referred to 
in the 1973 UN Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid. 
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
As State Party to these landmark treaties, Malta has made an unequivocal 
declaration of its commitment to respect and to safeguard individual �nd (nqw) 
collective rights and liberties. Recognition of the competence of the Human 
Rights Committee and of the Committee Against Torture to receive State Party 
complaints and individual communications, alone, constitutes sufficient 
evidence for: this commitment to be now considered entrenched in Malta's 
foreign policy considerations. 
Provisions for new fundamental rights and freedoms, proscription of new 
criminal offences and extension of the traditional reach of State criminal 
jurisdiction, are a fairly loaded brief for any government legal officer and no 
doubt the Attorney General's Office will relish the opportunity to advise 
Government on such matters. However, it is the obligation to legislate, per 
se, and the form which that legislation takes that will determine whether or 
not Malta detracts force from this admirable, though overdue, endorsement 
of a global scheme designed for the protection of human rights. 
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